During the past decade we have witnessed a growing interest in the psychology of forgiveness, both in the public (e.g., Time Magazine, 1999) and scientific domains (e.g., McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Scobie & Scobie, 1998; Worthington, 1999) . Forgiveness is often operationally defined in terms of behavioral, affective, and cognitive responses following an interpersonal offense (e.g., Enright & The Human Development Study Group, 1991 Group, , 1996 . Individuals are described as forgiving if they inhibit retaliatory or destructive responses and instead respond with conciliatory or constructive behaviors, affect, and cognition (McCullough, 2000; McCullough et al., 1997; North, 1987; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991; Subkoviak et al., 1995; Worthington, 1999) . For example, in forgiving, an individual may recognize situational determinants that caused an offender's actions (cognitive), feel sympathetic or compassionately toward the offender (affective), and discuss possible solutions to problems or help the offender (behavior). Forgiving responses reflect an underlying motivational change that counteracts individuals' more natural tendencies to withdraw and/or retaliate following an interpersonal offense (McCullough et al., 1997 (McCullough et al., , 1998 Rusbult et al., 1991) .
Recent theoretical development of the forgiveness construct has attempted to differentiate "true" forgiveness and "false" or "pseudoforgiveness" (e.g., Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1999; Enright & The Human Development Study Group, 1991 , McCullough & Worthington, 1994 Vitz & Mango, 1997) , an effort that has a long history in philosophers' attempts to understand forgiveness (Haber, 1991; Scobie & Scobie, 1998) . For example, described two dimensions of forgiveness: intrapsychic and interpersonal. The former involves the emotional and cognitive aspects of forgiveness, and the latter involves social or behavioral aspects. Whereas "total forgiveness" requires the presence of both dimensions, "hollow forgiveness" (or pseudoforgiveness) is characterized as the interpersonal act in the absence of the intrapsychic state. For example, a victim may verbally express forgiveness to the offender, yet may continue to harbor resentment and hurt. Such hollow forgiveness may be motivated by the victim's desire to fulfill a socially prescribed role (Trainer, 1981 ; see also Scobie & Scobie's, 1998 , description of responses to minor offenses). Similarly, victims may "forgive" to feel morally superior or to gain power over the offender (e.g., Trainer's "expedient forgiveness"). Baumeister et al. (1999) also described "silent forgiveness," in which the intrapsychic state is not accompanied by an interpersonal act, such as reconciliation.
Several theorists have explicitly noted that forgiveness does not require reconciliation (e.g., Enright & Zell, 1989; Scobie & Scobie, 1998 ; but see Power, 1994 , for an exception). In these conceptualizations, it is possible to forgive someone without reconciling, and in fact reconciliation may at times be undesirable (Fow, 1996; Freedman, 1998) . Hence, conciliatory behaviors need not include reunion of the two parties involved. For example, forgivers may express kind words about the offender to others or pray for the well-being of the offender.
True forgiveness (or "intrinsic forgiveness," Trainer, 1981 ) is defined as a conscious choice in which individuals give up their legitimate claim for retaliation following an interpersonal offense and substitute conciliatory responses. A key feature of some theorists' definitions of true forgiveness is that it is offered unconditionally (e.g., Al-Mabuk, Enright, & Cardis, 1995) . Thus, forgiveness is seen as a gift that is offered to an offender whose behaviors may justify retaliation or demands for restitution, but the forgiver neither retaliates nor requires particular behaviors of the offender (e.g., apology, restitution).
Such a conceptualization of forgiveness may be at odds with victims' experience of interpersonal offenses and forgiveness. That is, it is possible that victims may require an apology, an attempt by the offender to make amends, visual displays of the offender's remorse, or some other conditions before they forgive. Thus, the actual experience of forgiveness may not conform to theoretical definitions of forgiveness. Little psychological research has explored individuals' concepts of forgiveness, and participants' understanding of what it means to forgive has been open to idiographic interpretation in most forgiveness research. Thus, an important step in forgiveness research is to describe what individuals mean when they say they "forgive" or "do not forgive" and to compare these meanings to theoretical definitions of forgiveness. The narrative method (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Gergen & Gergen, 1988) provides an excellent tool for studying forgiveness as it occurs naturally, that is, in real-life situations and from the perspective of the person doing the forgiving.
The Narrative Method
Narratives provide subjective accounts of what happened from one person's (i.e., the narrator's) point of view. Narratives indicate the aspects of an incident a narrator regards as important and meaningful enough to be included in the story (Gergen & Gergen, 1988) . The objective truth of the events is not as important as the narration itself, which involves motivated choices regarding which details to emphasize. For example, if a narrator does not mention an apology, we cannot assume an apology did not occur or that it did occur and the narrator denies its occurrence. Instead, we assume that the presence or absence of an apology in an incident was not critical to the meaning of the narrator's personal story.
Baumeister and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Schultz & Baumeister, 1999) advocated the use of personal narratives as a tool for investigating the phenomenology of psychological constructs-that is, how people experience anger, guilt, shame, and interpersonal conflicts. Narratives may be particularly useful for understanding people's motivations as they describe important events in their lives. Baumeister and Newman (1994) proposed that people structure their experiences in story-like form to make sense of these experiences. In narratives about unpleasant events such as interpersonal offenses, people may seek to explain the purpose behind the offense and interpret and justify events in terms of their values. Narratives can also provide a sense of efficacy and control as individuals attribute the causes of events to internal or external determinants. Finally, Baumeister and Newman suggested that individuals may construct narratives so as to maximize their self-worth.
Baumeister and his colleagues (1990, 1995) used narratives to examine individuals' responses to interpersonal transgressions involving anger and guilt. They demonstrated that how individuals perceive interpersonal conflicts depends on their role as victim or offender. For example, Baumeister et al. (1990) observed that victims of interpersonal conflicts involving anger tend to place the incident in a longer time frame, with continuing anger and relationship damage, and to perceive the offenders' motivations as arbitrary or senseless. These same individuals, however, when writing about their own actions as an offender (using a repeated measures design), place the incident in an isolated context and perceive their own actions and motivations as justified. Thus, the role one assumes, either victim or offender, influences perception and/or recall of the event (see also Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen, 1992) . Baumeister et al. (1990) suggested that offenders are motivated to perceive their actions as inoffensive and to perceive themselves as acceptable people. Victims, in contrast, are motivated to portray the incident as harmful and themselves as deserving of sympathy or restitution; in so doing, victims may claim a higher moral standing. Thus, both victims and offenders seem to portray events in a self-serving manner. One purpose of the present study was to replicate these findings by having participants write about incidents involving anger or hurt in which they were the victim or the offender.
A second purpose of the study was to examine the role of forgiveness following interpersonal offenses. A growing body of empirical and theoretical work on forgiveness suggests that several variables influence whether forgiveness occurs following an offense, including empathy, apology, attributions, severity of the offense, arousal, and relationship closeness (McCullough, 2000; McCullough et al., 1998) . A key factor in Baumeister et al.'s (1990) narratives of interpersonal conflict was closure. They examined narratives for the presence or absence of apology to differentiate victims' and offenders' motives to seek closure regarding the incident. They reasoned that offenders would be expected to mention an apology as a way to bracket the offense as over. Social prescriptions indicate it is appropriate to forgive following an apology (Scobie & Scobie, 1998; Trainer, 1981) ; thus, offenders may mention an apology to demonstrate the offense is over, or at least, should be over. In contrast, victims may be less likely to mention an apology if they are motivated to maintain their victim status. Baumeister et al. observed that offenders mentioned an apology more than victims, supporting their hypothesis that offenders were more motivated to seek closure for the past offense compared with victims.
One way that offenders and victims can attain closure for an offense is through forgiveness. Thus, perceptions of past interpersonal offenses are likely to differ depending on whether the event is forgiven or not forgiven. For example, forgiven events may include more references to empathy and apologies than do unforgiven events and may be perceived as time-limited with positive consequences, regardless of whether the writer is victim or offender. In contrast, unforgiven events may be placed in a longer time frame with negative consequences when the writer is the victim (Baumeister et al., 1990) . Thus, in addition to writing as victim or perpetrator of an offense, we asked participants to choose events that were forgiven (other forgiveness or self-forgiveness, respectively), or not forgiven. Our aim was to extend Baumeister et al.'s (1990) findings by examining the role of forgiveness in victim and offender narratives.
To the extent that forgiveness represents a motivational shift from relationship-destructive tendencies to relationship-constructive tendencies (McCullough et al., 1997 (McCullough et al., , 1998 Rusbult et al., 1991) , victims' narratives of forgiven offenses may reflect the same degree of closure as offenders' narratives. However, forgiveness may also be used to enhance victims' position of moral superiority (Trainer, 1981) . Thus, hollow forgiveness Previous accounts of forgiveness have emphasized forgiveness of others rather than self-forgiveness. Baumeister et al. (1990) observed that offenders were motivated to portray their offense in the least negative light, thus preserving a positive self-concept. This self-enhancing motivation may be greater in offenders who have forgiven themselves and weakened in offenders who have not forgiven themselves.
Dispositional Empathy and Forgiveness
Using McAdams's (1995 McAdams's ( , 1996 framework, Emmons (2000) conceptualized personality not only as a set of dispositional traits, but also as personal strivings or motives and more broadly as integrative life stories. Thus, as snapshots of such life stories, narratives may reflect individual differences in personality. That is, narrative features may be included more or less frequently depending on the narrator's personality, as measured with standard instruments. For example, individuals high in dispositional empathy may be more likely to include empathy features in their narratives relative to individuals low in dispositional empathy. This is important because, as noted above, narratives are shaped by a host of factors, only one set of which are the objective "facts" of the incident described. Thus, by taking into account individual differences in key dimensions such as empathy, it is possible to determine the relative contributions of dispositional and situational determinants of narrative responses.
We assessed other-focused empathy, which comprises perspective-taking and emotional concern for another (Davis, 1983 (Davis, , 1996 , because previous theoretical work considered these components critical for forgiveness (e.g., Enright & The Human Development Study Group, 1991; McCullough, 2000; Worthington, , 1999 . Furthermore, empirical research has identified situational empathy (e.g., empathy for a specific offender) as a key mediator in the forgiveness process (e.g., McCullough et al., 1997 McCullough et al., , 1998 . It is possible that dispositional empathy may promote situational empathy, which may in turn promote forgiveness. Thus, we hypothesized that dispositional empathy would predict whether narrators included empathy-related features such as perspective taking in their narratives. In addition, one way in which dispositional empathy may facilitate forgiveness is through narrators' ability to identify benign causes for the offense, such as by recognizing that some offenses are due to external circumstances. Therefore, we also hypothesized that individuals high in dispositional empathy would be more likely to attribute the offense to benign causes.
Overview
Similar to Baumeister et al. (1990) , we asked participants to write two narratives. Participants recalled incidents in which they angered or hurt someone (offender) or someone angered or hurt them (victim). Further, participants chose situations in which they forgave or did not forgive (either themselves or the other person). We randomly assigned participants to one of four narrative pairings (order of narrative instructions was counterbalanced): offender forgives/does not forgive, victim forgives/does not forgive, offender forgives/victim forgives, and offender does not forgive/ victim does not forgive.
1 Following Baumeister et al. (1990) , we coded narratives for the presence or absence of variables relating to offense severity, blameworthiness, self-threat, time frame and consequences of the event, motives and intentions, writer's affective response, victim's response, and empathy for the other person.
Method

Participants
Participants were friends, family members, and coworkers of students in an advanced psychology research course at Loyola University Chicago. Each student asked 8 individuals to write two narratives for a class project. The final sample (N ϭ 122) wrote one or two usable narratives for a total of 215 narratives. The sample was predominantly female (60.7%), Caucasian (72.1%), and Catholic (49.2%) and were predominantly full-time students (58.2%; see Table 1 for demographics). The mean age was 27.7 (SD ϭ 13.2, range ϭ 18 -68, Mdn ϭ 21).
Materials
Narrative instructions. Instructions for each narrative asked participants to describe an incident in which they were the victim or offender of an offense that was either forgiven or not forgiven. Participants were asked to choose an especially important or memorable event and were encouraged to tell the whole story. The personality inventory followed the two narrative pages.
Empathy. The 28-item Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) comprises empathy-related statements that participants rate on a scale from 1 (Doesn't describe me well) to 5 (Describes me very well). Coefficient alphas in the present sample for the relevant subscales were .77 (Perspective-Taking) and .81 (Emotional Concern). We summed participants' responses for these two subscales to form an other-focused empathy measure (␣ ϭ .85) to assess dispositional empathy. The mean empathy score was 51.60 (SD ϭ 9.43, range ϭ 26 -68).
Procedure
Students in an advanced psychology research-methods course asked participants to write two narratives as part of a class project on forgiveness. Participants wrote about two interpersonal offenses and then completed the empathy measure. They then sealed their responses in an envelope, which was returned to the course instructor (Jeanne S. Zechmeister). Most participants wrote two narratives that conformed to the instructions, although some participants wrote they could not think of an event that satisfied the instructions (see Table 2 ). The average length of the narratives was 157.6 words and 9.5 sentences. A wide range of events was described, including sexual infidelities, drug-or alcohol-related deaths, and social humiliations. Two coders evaluated the narratives for the presence or absence of variables associated with the offense severity, blameworthiness, self-threat, time frame, consequences, intentions, affective responses, empathy, and forgiveness. These variables were selected to replicate previous research on victim and offender portrayals of interpersonal offenses (see Baumeister et al., 1990) . Dichotomous coding was used to increase the objectivity and reliability of the ratings. The mean agreement was 86.1% (SD ϭ 11.2, range ϭ 54%-100%). After coding the narratives independently, the two coders discussed discrepancies until consensus was reached. A series of 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 chi-square analyses examined differences in narratives as a function of victim versus offender role, forgiven versus not forgiven events, and the presence or absence of coded features.
Results
One goal of this study was to replicate Baumeister et al.'s (1990) findings for victim and offender narratives of interpersonal conflict. In general, we successfully replicated their findings (see Table 3 ). Participants' self-serving narration was most apparent when they described the offender's intentions and motives. When writing as offenders, compared with victims, narrators more often portrayed their actions as caused by external or mitigating circumstances (44.2% vs. 19.8%), explained their actions could not be helped (13.5% vs. 5.4%), and asserted their actions were justified (61.5% vs. 11.7%). Offenders were more likely than victims to implicate the victim in provoking the incident (22.1% vs. 1.8%) and to state that the cause of the incident included the victim (63.5% vs. 33.3%).
In contrast, victims were more likely than offenders to state explicitly that the offender's motives were incoherent or senseless (12.6% vs. 4.9%) and more often portrayed the offender's motives as arbitrary (50.5% vs. 14.4%), inconsistent (23.4% vs. 11.5%), and immoral (14.4% vs. 1.9%). Victims' accounts were more likely than offenders' accounts to describe the relationship as damaged (38.7% vs. 18.4%) and to claim that they suffered from multiple provocations (38.7% vs. 12.7%). Victims' accounts, compared with offenders' accounts, described continuing anger (23.4% vs. 3.0%), and portrayed their anger as justified (85.6% vs. 54.9%) even though they did not express their anger overtly (25.2% vs. 5.8%). Offenders, on the other hand, were more likely to describe the victim's response as an overreaction (9.8% vs. 2.7%). Lest offenders appear too callous, we should note that narrators who wrote as offenders were more likely than victim narrators to mention regret for the incident (60.6% vs. 5.4%) and to blame themselves (59.6% vs. 2.7%). Baumeister et al. (1990) observed that offenders, compared with victims, were more likely to mention an apology in their narratives, suggesting that offenders were motivated to describe the offense as over and isolated. Similarly, offenders in our study were slightly more likely to mention an apology than were victims (16.0% vs. 8.1%). The presence of an apology, however, was moderated by forgiveness.
Narratives of Forgiveness and Unforgiveness
These findings for victim and offender narratives suggest that narrators' self-enhancing motives influenced the features they included in their stories of interpersonal offense (see also Baumeister et al., 1990; Draycott & Dabbs, 1998; Gonzales et al., 1992) . We hypothesized that these motives may be reduced or eliminated when an offense is forgiven, relative to when the offense is not forgiven. However, if narrators describe hollow or incomplete forgiveness, their narratives may not differ in terms of closure (e.g., time span, consequences of the offense). We also examined the narratives for clues regarding the forgiving process, including narrators' mentions of apologies, excuses, making amends, revenge, affect, and empathy. Results indicated that forgiveness, relative to unforgiveness, dramatically influenced the stories that people tell about interpersonal conflicts.
Narratives of forgiven offenses, whether written from the victim or offender perspective, were more likely than narratives of unforgiven offenses to include features that indicated the offense was closed. Narrators of forgiven offenses were more likely to describe the offender's apology (17.8% vs. 4.3%), 2 (1, N ϭ 211) ϭ 9.07, p ϭ .003, ϭ .21, attempts to make amends (18.6% vs. 4.3%), 2 (1, N ϭ 210) ϭ 9. Baumeister et al.'s (1990) study, individuals' narratives of interpersonal conflict were also differentiated on the basis of the presence of forgiveness or unforgiveness.
A central aspect of forgiveness definitions is that victims renounce their desire for revenge. We coded narrators' desire for revenge and whether revenge occurred. Only 19 (8.9%) narrators mentioned revenge, and this was unrelated to whether narrators described a forgiven or unforgiven offense and whether the narrator was an offender or victim. It is not clear from these data whether revenge was not important in narrators' accounts of the events or whether social desirability concerns prevented participants from mentioning revenge.
For the remaining coded variables, narrators' descriptions depended on whether they wrote as a victim or offender and whether the offense was forgiven or unforgiven. To explicate these effects, we describe forgiven and unforgiven narratives first from the victims' perspective and then from the offender's perspective.
Victim narratives. Of the 111 victim narratives, 63 were written in the offender-forgiven condition and 48 were written in the offender-not-forgiven condition. Consistent with the manipulation, victims were more likely to state explicitly they had forgiven the offender in the forgiven condition (84.1%) than in the not-forgiven condition (0%). Moreover, 25% of victims who wrote about unforgiveness stated they would "never forgive" the offender (see Table 4 , Victim narratives columns).
The time frame and consequences of the offense differed depending on whether victims forgave the offender or did not forgive. Compared with forgiving narrators, victims who wrote about unforgiven offenses were more likely to refer to long-term events preceding the event (33.3% vs. 58.3%) and relationship damage (12.7% vs. 72.9%) and to state that they are still angry (11.1% vs. 39.6%). In general, forgiving and unforgiving victims described their offender's motives similarly. Three important differences did emerge in victims' descriptions of motives, however. Victims who forgave were more likely than unforgiving victims to state that the offender could not help his or her actions (9.5% vs. 0%). In contrast, unforgiving victims were more likely than forgiving victims to portray the offenders' actions as immoral (27.1% vs. 4.8%) and deliberately cruel or harmful (29.2% vs. 7.9%), suggesting that a potential stumbling block to forgiveness is vic- tims' perception that the offender behaved immorally or unjustly. Unforgiveness, therefore, may be related to a moral stance that justice should prevail over forgiveness. Victims who forgave their offender were more likely than unforgiving victims to mention the offender's apology (12.7% vs. 2.1%) and attempts to make amends (17.5% vs. 2.1%), their own attempts to make amends (14.3% vs. 2.1%), and feelings of love (7.9% vs. 0%). In contrast, unforgiving victims were more likely than forgiving victims to describe the offender as making excuses for the offense (20.8% vs. 7.9%).
To the extent that apologies and making amends can be viewed as signs that offenders and victims achieve closure regarding an offense, victims who forgave admitted more closure than victims who did not forgive. Similarly, forgiving victims were less likely than unforgiving victims to place the offense in a longer time frame with lasting negative consequences. In fact, forgiveness, relative to unforgiveness, was associated with positive consequences and victims' denial of lasting negative consequences. Note, however, that even when offenders were forgiven, a large proportion of victims referred to long-term events with the offender (33.3%) and multiple provocations (31.7%), their present circumstances (49.2%), and angry affect (50.8%) and portrayed their anger as justified (76.2%). These findings suggest that some victims who forgive do not fully relinquish their victim status but instead are careful to describe both their victim status and their forgiveness of the offender.
Finally, we coded empathy using Davis's (1983) description of four types of empathy: fantasy, personal distress, perspective taking, and emotional concern. Victims who forgave their offender were more likely to take the offender's perspective (39.7%) and to express emotional concern for their offender (11.1%) compared with victims who wrote about unforgiven offenses (10.4% and 2.1%, respectively). Coders also judged narratives for the extent of self-and other focus using two dichotomous, independent criteria (e.g., self-focused vs. minimal self-focus). Narratives of unforgiven offenses evidenced more self-focus than did forgiveness narratives (95.8% vs. 71.4%), and coders more often judged forgiveness narratives as other focused than they did unforgiveness narratives (30.2% vs. 0%). These results are consistent with previous research on the relationship between forgiveness and empathy (e.g., McCullough et al., 1997) , in which forgiveness was associated with victims' ability to understand the offender's perspective.
Offender narratives. Of the 104 offender narratives, 55 described an offense in which the narrator had forgiven him-or herself, and 49 described an offense in which the narrator had not forgiven him-or herself. These offender narratives differed dramatically from the victim stories (see Table 4 , Offender narratives columns). Of the 41 coded items comparing forgiven and notforgiven narratives shown in Table 3 , only 9 (22.0%) of the coded items had similar results for victim and offender narratives.
It is interesting that whether offenders forgave themselves or did not forgive themselves was unrelated to reports of their victim's forgiveness (16.4% vs. 15.6%, ns). The motives and intentions identified by offenders differed as a function of whether they forgave themselves. Narrators who did not forgive themselves were more likely to portray their offense as arbitrary or senseless (22.4%) compared with narrators who had forgiven themselves (7.3%). Offenders who did not forgive themselves reported more regret (89.8%), self-blame (89.8%), and guilt (73.5%) than did self-forgiving offenders (34.5%, 32.7%, and 40.0%, respectively). In contrast, offenders who forgave themselves were more likely to report an improved relationship with their victim (4.2% vs. 16.4%). In addition, offenders who had forgiven themselves were more likely to portray the victim's response as an overreaction (0% vs. 18.2%), report that the victim provoked the offense (12.2% vs. 30.9%), and describe feelings of anger about the offense (4.1% vs. 25.5%). In this way, offenders who forgave themselves implicated the victim in sharing the blame for the offense.
Similar to victims' accounts, offenders who forgave themselves were more likely to mention an apology (23.6%) and making amends (20.0%) than were offenders who did not forgive themselves (6.7% and 6.8%, respectively), indicating offenders' attempts to close the incident. Indeed, whereas offenders in Baumeister et al.'s (1990) study described offenses with a limited time frame and consequences, this tended to be true only for offenders who had forgiven themselves in our study. Thus, forgiving themselves may have been a way for offenders to diminish the gravity of their offense and experience closure regarding the offense.
In the previous section we noted that victims' narratives of forgiveness, compared with unforgiveness, were more likely to include empathy features such as perspective taking and emotional concern for their offender. When narrators wrote as offenders, however, the relationship between forgiveness and empathy features was reversed. Offenders who had not forgiven themselves demonstrated more emotional concern for their victims (69.4%) and other focus (53.1%) than did offenders who had forgiven themselves (36.4% and 29.1%, respectively). Unforgiving offenders also experienced more personal distress as a result of thinking about their victims than did offenders who forgave themselves (30.6% vs. 9.1%). These findings suggest that empathy for their victim's experience may make offenders' self-forgiveness more difficult. In contrast, offenders who forgave themselves demonstrated more self-focus (92.7%) than did offenders who did not forgive themselves (71.4%).
Descriptions of offenses. Across all narratives, most of the offenses involved friends (34.4%), family (34.0%), and intimates (19.1%), rather than strangers (2.3%) or acquaintances (10.2%). Victims and offenders differed in the offenses they selected to describe. When writing as victims, narrators were more likely to select offenses involving threats to self-esteem or worth (63.1%) compared with offenders (11.5%), 2 (1, N ϭ 215) ϭ 60.42, p Ͻ .001, ϭ .53; this effect was stronger for unforgiven ( ϭ .61) than forgiven ( ϭ .46) offenses. In addition, coders evaluated offenses according to blameworthiness (accidental/negligent, intentional). When writing as victims, narrators portrayed offenses as intentional (61.3%) rather than accidental or negligent (38.7%); however, when writing as offenders, narrators' offenses were equally intentional (49.0%) or accidental/negligent (51.0%), 2 (1, N ϭ 215) ϭ 3.25, p ϭ .072, ϭ .12.
Forgiveness instructions were more directly related to narrators' descriptions of the severity of harm following the offense. Regardless of victim versus offender instructions, offenses written in response to no-forgiveness instructions were more often coded as moderate or severe harm (79.6%) rather than mild harm (20.4%), whereas offenses written in response to forgiveness instructions were equally mild (48.7%) or moderate to severe harm (51.3%), 2 (1, N ϭ 215) ϭ 18.59, p Ͻ .001, ϭ Ϫ.29. Two possibilities exist: Either moderate to severe offenses are more difficult to forgive, or, once forgiven, offenses that may have been severe were portrayed as mild in their harm. One clue to resolving this time-order confounding is found in narrators' descriptions of their emotional arousal at the time of the offense (none/mild vs. moderate/severe). Victims' arousal was more likely to be coded as moderate or severe (76.4%) compared with offenders' arousal (61.5%), 2 (1, N ϭ 214) ϭ 5.51, p ϭ .019, ϭ .16. This effect was largely due to the difference between victims' and offenders' arousal in stories of forgiveness: Forgiving victims were more likely to describe moderate to severe arousal at the time of the offense (75.8%) than offenders were (56.4%), 2 (1, N ϭ 117) ϭ 4.96, p ϭ .026, ϭ .21. This finding suggests that forgiveness may lead victims to portray offenses initially experienced as moderately or severely arousing as ultimately mild in their harm.
Dispositional Empathy and Narrative Features
To increase the reliability of measuring the relationship between dispositional empathy and narrative features, we aggregated narrative features to create two continuous variables measuring empathy-related constructs. Other-focused empathy comprised coded narrative features of perspective taking and emotional concern, and the benign-attributions aggregate comprised statements indicating that the offender's actions could not be helped, were externally caused, and were justified. There was a trend for high dispositional-empathy (ϩ1 SD) participants to include more otherfocused empathy in their narratives (M ϭ 0.63) than did low dispositional-empathy (Ϫ1 SD) participants (M ϭ 0.47), b ϭ .01, SE ϭ .005, t(213) ϭ 1.94, p ϭ .053, ␤ ϭ .12. Furthermore, high dispositional-empathy participants made more benign attributions for the offense (M ϭ 0.90) relative to low dispositional-empathy participants (M ϭ 0.64), b ϭ .01, SE ϭ .005, t(211) ϭ 2.83, p ϭ .005, ␤ ϭ .17. However, the relationship between dispositional empathy and benign attributions was moderated by forgiveness and narrator role. High dispositional-empathy victims who had forgiven their offender made more benign attributions (M ϭ 0.72) relative to low dispositional-empathy victims who had forgiven (M ϭ 0.16), b ϭ .03, SE ϭ .01, t(211) ϭ 2.70, p ϭ .007, ␤ ϭ .34. Thus, dispositionally empathic victims showed an ability to consider benign motives for the forgiven offense. Surprisingly, we observed a similar effect of dispositional empathy on the attributions of offenders who had not forgiven themselves. High dispositionalempathy offenders were more likely to make benign attributions for their behavior-despite their failure to forgive themselvesrelative to low dispositional-empathy offenders (M ϭ 1.33 and 0.95, respectively), b ϭ .02, SE ϭ .01, t(211) ϭ 2.20, p ϭ .029, ␤ ϭ .23. There was no effect of dispositional empathy on the attributions of unforgiving victims and self-forgiving offenders. In sum, dispositional empathy was directly related to the presence of empathy in narratives, and this relationship was not moderated by narrators' role or forgiveness. In contrast, the relationship between dispositional empathy and benign attributions for the offense depended on narrators' role and whether the offense was forgiven or not forgiven.
Discussion
The results of this study demonstrate that individuals' perceptions of interpersonal offenses depend both on their role as victim or offender and on whether they have forgiven or not forgiven the offense. Previous narrative research demonstrated that offenders are motivated to portray their offenses as over and isolated, with no lingering negative consequences, and to perceive their motives as justifiable (Baumeister et al., 1990) . Victims, in contrast, portray offenses as open and continuing, perhaps as a way to maintain their victim status. In general, our results replicated these findings and extended them by exploring the role of forgiveness in people's understanding of their interpersonal conflicts. A central question of this study was whether forgiveness was related to differences in offenders' and victims' narratives of past offenses. In addition, we also analyzed narratives to reveal whether participants portrayed forgiveness as conditional (i.e., dependent on apologies, restitution) and whether narrators' conceptualizations of forgiveness could be characterized as total or hollow .
Clearly, forgiveness narratives were associated with narrators' descriptions of more positive outcomes and affect, regardless of whether the narrator wrote as a victim or an offender. Forgiveness narratives were more likely to include indications that the offender and victim had achieved closure about the offense, as evidenced by apologies, descriptions of happy endings, and feelings of peace. In contrast, narrators who described offenses that had not been forgiven were more likely to describe negative consequences, refer to present circumstances, and describe continuing anger that was justified. Thus, in general, narratives of forgiveness had the appearance of closure; the offense was over and in the past. Narratives of unforgiven offenses continued to remain open, with negative consequences and affect lingering to influence narrators' present circumstances. In addition, 25% of victims extended the influence of the offense into the future, reporting they "would never forgive" their offender.
A central question in the psychology of forgiveness is whether forgiveness is conditional; that is, does forgiveness follow only after the offender expresses regret, apologizes, or makes amends? Although forgiveness narratives were more likely to describe the offender's apology and attempts to make amends than unforgiveness narratives were, these features were present in fewer than 20% of the forgiveness narratives. Thus, apologies and restitution did not appear to be critical features of the forgiveness process for many narrators. Similarly, victims rarely described the offenders' regret for the offense, regardless of whether the offense was forgiven or not forgiven. Furthermore, when offenders experienced regret for their actions, it was associated with lack of self-forgiveness rather than forgiveness. These findings suggest that although apologies and restitution are more frequently associated with forgiveness than unforgiveness, these conditions may not be necessary for forgiveness to occur.
These conclusions are consistent with recent findings for a largely Christian student sample who were asked to indicate their agreement with several statements about forgiveness (Kanz, 2000) . Two-thirds of students in that sample believed that an apology is not necessary for forgiveness. Together, these findings support a conceptualization of forgiveness as a choice or act on the part of the forgiver that does not necessarily depend on the offender's actions or repentance (e.g., Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992; Hope, 1987) . In contrast, empirical studies have indicated that victims of interpersonal offenses feel more favorably toward offenders and are less likely to retaliate against them when the offenders offer apologies (e.g., Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989) . Thus, what individuals say about apologies, in narratives or in response to statements about forgiveness, may not correspond well to how they actually respond to apologies. Additional research that compares individuals' beliefs about the role of apologies and restitution to their actual responses will help to clarify the extent to which forgiveness is conditional on certain behaviors of the offender.
Victims' Forgiveness of Offenders
The narratives of interpersonal offenses were more complex than an open/closed analysis would indicate. Victims' narratives indicated aspects of closure as well as self-enhancing motives. Victims who forgave, for example, often described and justified their anger and mentioned multiple provocations and the negative consequences of the offense. Similar to unforgiving victims, forgivers were more likely than offenders to describe the offender's motives as arbitrary or senseless rather than justified. Thus, some victims in our study may have sought to enhance their moral standing by maintaining their victim status while proclaiming forgiveness. Such forgiveness, however, may be characterized as expedient forgiveness (Trainer, 1981) .
It is important to note that participants were asked to describe their whole story; therefore, victims who forgave may have felt required to describe all events that led to their anger and the negative consequence of the offense and to justify their anger, even if these features were not important in their current thinking about the forgiven offense. Thus, rather than being motivated to maintain their victim status, while at the same time portraying themselves as forgivers, some victims in our study may have tried to justify that the offense was serious enough to warrant their effort at forgiveness.
Slightly more than 10% of the victims who forgave their offender described that they were still angry. Definitions of forgiveness frequently refer to victims' "letting go" of anger and hurt in favor of conciliatory responses (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1999; Enright and The Human Development Study Group, 1991; McCullough & Worthington, 1994; Scobie & Scobie, 1998) . Thus, we might characterize these victims' forgiveness as hollow because of their continued anger toward the offender . Another interpretation is that these victims have made the commitment to forgive, but may be at only the beginning of the forgiveness process (Enright & The Human Development Study Group, 1991; Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992) . Thus, rather than conceptualizing forgiveness as either total or hollow, a process approach characterizes individuals' progress in stages of forgiveness. Given that our instructions asked narrators to describe forgiven offenses, however, we assumed that victims believed they had forgiven their offender (indeed, 84.1% explicitly stated they had forgiven their offender). Our analysis of narratives using dichotomous coding for the presence or absence of features related to interpersonal conflict and forgiveness precluded a sequential analysis of the process from conflict to forgiveness. Additional research that asks narrators to describe their process of forgiveness and codes features based on if-then contingencies (e.g., if offender apologizes, then victim's anger is eliminated) would help to identify processes related to forgiveness (e.g., Fehr, Baldwin, Collins, Patterson, & Benditt, 1999) .
Finally, additional theoretical and empirical work on victims' forgiveness must address the extent to which it is desirable for victims to exclude anger and details of the offense from their personal narratives of the forgiven conflict and relationship with the offender. Kanz's (2000) study of Christian students revealed that three fourths of the students believed it is possible to be simultaneously angry and forgiving, and two thirds believed that it is not necessary to forget the hurt when an offense is forgiven. Similarly, our victims may not have been motivated to maintain their victim status in relation to their offender but, instead, were motivated to remember that they are vulnerable to hurt. Continued anger at the offense, rather than the offender, may protect individuals from additional harm. Several theorists have argued that forgiveness must not be confused with forgetting (e.g., Enright & Coyle, 1998; Parsons, 1988; Worthington, 1999) ; indeed, some researchers have argued that forgetting the past harm may place individuals at risk (e.g., Fow, 1996; Freedman, 1998; Katz, Street, & Arias, 1997) .
Offenders' Self-Forgiveness
Although offenders who forgave themselves often expressed regret and self-blame, they also implicated their victim in causing the offense more than did offenders who did not forgive themselves. Self-forgiving offenders also described their own anger and tended to justify their actions more than offenders who did not forgive themselves. In general, narratives of offenders who forgave themselves were self-focused and portrayed victims as deserving what they got. These offenders seemed to achieve selfforgiveness relatively easily. Similar to Baumeister et al.'s (1990) findings, offenders in our study often tried to usurp the victim status by portraying their offense as relatively minor and not deserving of the victim's angry reaction.
Perhaps the narrators who expressed the most difficulty in our study were those who could not forgive themselves. Many offenders expressed regret and guilt and blamed themselves; some reported they would never forgive themselves despite their efforts to apologize or make amends for their wrong, even when their victim had forgiven them. These offenders seemed at a loss for how to let go of their past offense and move toward forgiveness. Previous narrative research revealed that guilt can strengthen interpersonal relationships if it leads to behavior change following a transgression (Baumeister et al., 1995; Leith & Baumeister, 1998) . In contrast, shame-in which negative affect and evaluations focus enhanced greatly when they forgive. However, if apologies and restitution are not readily apparent, the victims' moral standing is enhanced when they describe their forgiveness. on the self rather than the offensive behavior-limits individuals' efforts to deal effectively with their offense and the consequences for their relationship (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Lewis, 1987; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992) . Leith and Baumeister observed that shame was associated with personaldistress empathy, in which individuals focus on their own anxiety and distress in response to their empathy for their victims' suffering. In our study, nearly one third of offenders who did not forgive themselves wrote about their own distress in response to their empathy for their victims, suggesting that one obstacle to selfforgiveness is feelings of distress and shame about oneself, rather than guilt for the offending actions.
Empathy and Forgiveness
Previous investigations of forgiveness demonstrated that forgiveness is more likely when victims empathize with the offender, through either taking the offender's perspective or feeling emotional concern for the victim (e.g., McCullough et al., 1997 McCullough et al., , 1998 Worthington, , 1999 . The results of this investigation supported the association between situational empathy and victims' forgiveness of offenders. Victims who forgave were more likely to demonstrate perspective taking and emotional concern for their offender than were victims who did not forgive. However, the opposite occurred when narrators wrote as offenders: Selfforgiveness was associated with less empathy for the victim and often was associated with righteous self-focus and victim blaming. It is easy to wonder whether their victims forgave these offenders as easily as they seemed to forgive themselves.
To the extent that both empathy for others and forgiveness are desirable prosocial responses following interpersonal offenses, a dilemma exists when offenders seek to forgive themselves. Empathy that results in personal distress and shame is associated with less self-forgiveness, which may prevent the offender from experiencing closure following the offense. Thus, interventions aimed at helping offenders to forgive themselves should focus on empathy for the victim and guilt for the particular behaviors associated with the offense, but help offenders to prevent personal distress and shame in response to their actions.
Although the empathy evident in the narratives appears to have been more situational than dispositional, we observed some support for dispositional empathy as an important moderator in the forgiveness process. Overall, the narratives reflected individual differences in empathy, as high dispositional-empathy individuals tended to evidence more narrative empathy, regardless of their role (victim vs. offender), and whether or not forgiveness had occurred. Dispositional empathy was also associated with closure-promoting attributional processes such as asserting benign motives for the offender's behavior; however, this association was context dependent. As expected, there was a strong link between dispositional empathy and the presence of benign attributions in victims' narratives depicting forgiveness of an offender: Empathic victims more frequently identified nonmaleficent causes of the offender's behavior. Thus, in this context, dispositional empathy may promote successful closure and may be predictive of true forgiveness or a more advanced stage of the forgiveness process than that achieved by the low dispositionally empathic victims who express forgiveness.
An unexpected finding was that high-empathy offenders appeared to justify their behavior by offering benign attributions more frequently (relative to low-empathy offenders) when they had not forgiven themselves. As noted above, narratives of offenders who forgave themselves were associated with less empathy for the victim. Dispositionally empathic offenders may find it difficult to forgive themselves if they see self-forgiveness as being at odds with their usual empathic stance. What may be portrayed in these offenders' narratives is their effort to obtain closure while remaining empathic toward the victim. In contrast to their victim role when forgiving others, where their benign attributions may represent a more advanced stage of forgiveness, offenders' benign attributions for their behavior may represent an early stage of true self-forgiveness. That is, perhaps high dispositional-empathy offenders who have not yet forgiven themselves grapple with the dilemma of choosing between the two competing prosocial responses of forgiveness and empathy and attempt to resolve their conundrum by considering mitigating factors that would permit them to forgive themselves while acknowledging their culpability and maintaining a high level of empathy for their victim. The relationships among dispositional empathy, situational empathy, attributions, and forgiveness are obviously complex and merit further investigation.
Limitations and Future Directions
The sample for this investigation was predominantly students from a private, Catholic university, but we also included narratives from members of the surrounding community to increase the diversity of the sample and offenses. We sampled a range of interpersonal offenses, including betrayals of trust, infidelities, drug-and alcohol-related deaths, and social humiliations. Our reading of these narratives suggest that experiences of forgiveness (and unforgiveness) likely differ across the life span. Our limited sampling across the life span precluded analyses that compared narratives according to age, victim or offender role, and forgiveness versus no-forgiveness instructions. Additional research that examines developmental aspects of the forgiveness process, such as the frequency of forgiveness, changes in the types of offenses that require forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and changes in people's conceptualizations of what it means to forgive, will enhance our understanding of forgiveness processes.
Clearly, victims and offenders differed in the offenses they chose to describe in our study. In general, victims tended to select offenses that were self-threatening and intentional. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether victim and offender narratives differed because of the role of the narrator or because of the different offenses described. In addition, coders rated narratives of forgiveness-regardless of whether they represented victim or offender perspectives-as less severe in their consequences. Features associated with forgiveness, such as positive outcomes and affect, may have been portrayed more frequently because the offenses were less severe, rather than as a result of the forgiveness process (although three quarters of forgiving victims did portray their emotional arousal at the time of the offense as moderate or severe). In addition, it is likely that the forgiveness process differs depending on the severity of the offense (Scobie & Scobie, 1998) . Future research that removes the confounding between the type of offense, narrator role, and forgiveness will help to clarify how individuals forgive themselves and others for different types of offenses.
Although personal narratives may help to reveal individuals' motives and beliefs about events in their lives, they do not allow researchers to examine cognitive processes associated with the encoding and retrieval of these events. However, our goal in examining participants' narratives of forgiveness was to describe their understanding of forgiveness and to assess how well this understanding matches theoretical and empirical work on forgiveness to date. Subjective, personal accounts of interpersonal conflicts do not necessarily reveal the truth about what happened, but do offer valuable information about what people think forgiveness is and how they think it occurs. An additional limitation of narrative data is that we are unable to identify causal mechanisms underlying the forgiveness process. Despite this limitation, however, we gain external validity in our descriptions of forgiveness by examining participants' stories of the important conflicts in their lives. Narrative research, in conjunction with experimental work, will improve our understanding of the forgiveness process.
One goal of this research was to compare narrators' conceptualizations of forgiveness and unforgiveness to current theories of forgiveness using narrators' own words, on the basis of their own experiences of interpersonal conflict. We successfully demonstrated that personal narratives of forgiveness often do not include apologies and making amends and that forgiveness stories are more likely to portray the offense as over and isolated, and with positive consequences. However, forgiveness stories also described anger and negative consequences. Future research that examines the extent to which negative and positive cognition, affect, and behavior coexist as part of forgiveness will help to clarify this complex process.
Conclusion
Accumulating evidence suggests that how individuals portray interpersonal conflicts depends on their role as victim or offender. The findings of this investigation demonstrated that whether offenses are forgiven or not forgiven was also strongly related to participants' inclusion of narrative features and moderated the influence of narrators' role. Personal narratives offer a rich source of information about how people conceptualize and experience forgiveness in their everyday lives and should help to guide theoretical developments in the growing area of empirical forgiveness research.
